How to Get Out of Iraq

How to Get Out of Iraq

Juan Cole's formula includes a phased withdrawal designed to force the shia and Kurds to compromise with the Sunni resistance when American repression no longer protects their "Allies".

But what about all that oil?

Here is a partial answer:
Let me second Juan Cole's central point, which I would reword as follows: instead of the surge vs. unilateral withdrawal debate there needs to be a search for a rational, negotiated or multilaterally monitored disengagement of US troops. I realize it's a tall order -- but not necessarily more daunting than a military solution.

To think about this we need to stop envisioning battlefield scenarios and start imagining ceasefire scenarios, or violence-reduction strategies. And we need to stop acting as if the future of Iraq were an either-or decision to be made in Washington between Democrats and Republicans. It's going to involve Iran, especially, and Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and other countries in the region, and it's likely to be connected to the larger Arab-Israeli conundrum. A plan for peace in Iraq could really use the the active collaboration of Europe, Russia, and China, too.

I wonder whether Pelosi's visit to Damascus, along with however those British detainees were released, indicates an attenuation of the "Syria-is-naughty, Iran-is-naughty, so we are not speaking to them" line. I am not sure of this, since by many accounts the Speaker went bearing a message from Israel, and not from Washington. But perhaps she brought something home.

There are a vast array of alternatives between pacification by force and a unilateral pull-out (Gaza, anyone?) Let's try to think of some.

Remember cease-fires, before they were vilified this summer by Rice and Bolton? Is there no one in the world with the moral authority to at least call for all sides to halt the bloodshed, if only for a day? The civil wars in Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon didn't only wear themselves out, there were talks leading to negotiations that eventually, if imperfectly, led to a laying down of arms of principle factions. Can anyone imagine scenarios for violence abatement? If a reduction in the American use of force can only make matters worse, as the consensus seems to hold, then are there visions for how, possibly, some other kind of policing or peace-making or financial incentives (or poetry readings?) might mitigate those outcomes?

This discussion also raised anew the question of what we are doing in Iraq, now. Are we there to protect the Kurds? To prevent full-scale ethnic cleansing? Or to preserve the al-Maliki government (which, tautologically, asks us to remain there for that purpose)? or to secure an American strategic presence? or to get a the oil legislation passed?

If we can specify specific goals, then policy debates can be reformulated: what would it take to protect the Kurds, from Turkey or from Iraqi elements? Would the current Iraqi government really survive an American departure? What would it take to secure an indefinate SoFA, if that is our minimal national interest, that would maintain bases but get troops out of the cities? What incentives might Iran be offered to support Shia peacemakers?

Sheila Carapico
University of Richmond